Justice Sherman Minton And The
Protection Of Minority Rights by Atkinson, David N.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 6
Winter 1-1-1977
Justice Sherman Minton And The Protection Of
Minority Rights
David N. Atkinson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David N. Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton And The Protection Of Minority Rights, 34 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 97 (1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol34/iss1/6
JUSTICE SHERMAN MINTON AND THE
PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS*
DAVID N. ATKINSON**
Discrimination in education, in housing, and in employment
brought cases before the Vinson Court which were often resolved by
a nearly unanimous vote, but they frequently raised constitutional
and institutional dilemmas of agonizing dimensions. A fundamental
commitment of the Court at this time was accurately reflected by
Justice Jackson's off-the-Court admonition to his colleagues on the
inadvisability of seizing "the initiative in shaping the policy of the
law, either by constitutional interpretation or by statutory construc-
tion."'
There were strong voices within the Vinson Court which held
rigorously to Justice Holmes' dictum that "judges do and must legis-
late, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from
molar to molecular motions." Institutional caution, theoretically at
* This is the fifth and final of a series of articles written by Professor Atkinson
dealing with the Supreme Court career of Justice Sherman Minton. The previous
articles in this series are: Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty, 50 IND.
L.J. 34 (1974); Justice Sherman Minton and Behavior Patterns Inside the Supreme
Court, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 716 (1974); Opinion-Writing on the Supreme Court, 1949-
1956: The Views of Justice Sherman Minton, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 105 (1975); From New Deal
Liberal to Supreme Court Conservative: The Metamorphosis of Justice Sherman
Minton, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 361.
** Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-Kansas City; B.A., M.A.,
J.D., Ph. D., University of Iowa. I wish to thank Professor Hugh W. Speer of the School
of Education at the University of Missouri-Kansas City for his kind permission to use
excerpts from his tape recorded interview with Justice Thurgood Marshall.
I R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 79
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
2 Justice Frankfurter expanded on this same idea when he wrote Justice Black:
Some time ago at the end of a, to me, very stimulating talk between
us, I told you that you were a Benthamite. Since I regard Bentham
as the most fruitful law reformer of the Nineteenth Century, that was
of course fundamentally a term of praise. But as is so often true of a
reformer who seeks to get rid of the accumulated abuses of the past
Bentham at times threw out the baby with the bath. In his rigorous
and candid desire to rid the law of many far-reaching abuses intro-
duced by judges, he was not unnaturally propelled to the opposite
extreme of wishing all law to be formulated by legislation, deeming
most that judges do a usurpation by incompetent men as to matters
concerning which he believed them guilty of 'judicial legislation.'
That phrase 'judicial legislation' has become ever since a staple term
of condemnation. I, too, am opposed to judicial legislation in its invid-
ious sense; but I deem equally mischievous-because founded on an
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least, precluded an initiating role by the Supreme Court. The line
between legislating and interpreting is shadowy and uncertain at
best, but when it has been unwarily crossed "it has provoked reac-
tions which have set back the cause it is designed to advance, and
has sometimes called down upon itself severe rebuke."
'3
And yet the court did not doubt its obligation to protect minority
interests from egregious abuse inflicted by majority flat. The Court's
power to restrain the majority was concomitant with its power to
protect minorities.'
Carefully, with determined deliberation, the Vinson Court moved
to insure protection under the Constitution for minority interests.
The Court's opinions evidenced unremitting concern with the consist-
ency of prior doctrine and, although the Vinson Court commenced a
period of activism in the area of civil liberties which was continued
and expanded by the Warren Court, it frequently disclaimed any
innovative intentions.
Few questions troubled Justice Minton more than the boundary
demarcations between state action constituting irrational discrimina-
untruth and an impossible aim-the notion that judges merely an-
nounce the law which they find and do not themselves inevitably have
a share in the law-making. Here, as elsewhere, the difficulty comes
from arguing in terms of absolutes when the matter at hand is condi-
tioned by circumstances, is contingent upon the everlasting problem
of how far is too far and how much is too much. Judges, as you well
know, cannot escape the responsibility of filling in gaps which the
finitude of even the most imaginative legislation renders inevitable.
And so it is that even in the countries governed exclusively by codes
and even in the best of all codes there are provisions saying in effect
that when a controversy arises in court for which the code offers no
provision the judges are not relieved of the duty of deciding the case
but must themselves fashion the law appropriate to the situation.
So the problem is not whether the judges make the law, but when and
how and how much. Holmes put it in his highbrow way, that 'they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions.' I used to say to my students that legislatures make law
wholesale, judges retail. In other words they cannot decide things by
invoking a new major premise out of whole cloth; they must take the
law that they do make out of the existing materials and with due
deference to the presuppositions of the legal system of which they have
been made a part. Of course, I know these are not mechanical devices,
and therefore not susceptible of producing automatic results. But they
sufficiently indicate the limits within which judges are to move.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Hugo L. Black (December 15, 1939). (The Felix
Frankfurter Papers; The Library of Congress.)
Jackson, supra note 1, at 80.
,Id.
JUSTICE MINTON
tion and private discrimination not prohibited by the Constitution.
He generally protected minority interests from irrational discrimina-
tion only when there was clear and persuasive evidence of direct state
action. He considered the Court's role necessarily circumscribed by
the language of the Constitution, which had been interpreted to mean
that the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment were applicable only to the states and that the Due
Process clause of the fifth amendment was applicable only to the
federal government. It was not, he thought, the Court's function to
safeguard minority interests from private discrimination, regardless
of its nature, if the fact of irrational discrimination by a government,
or an agency thereof, could not be directly established.
I. The Segregation Cases
Referring to the opinion of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts
v. City of Boston 5 which first introduced "into the jurisprudence of
Massachusetts the power of a government body to arrange the legal
rights of citizens on the basis of race,"' the Supreme Court upheld
city regulation which provided for the separation of the races in
Plessy v. Ferguson.' Justice John Marshall Harlan castigated the
Court's separate but equal doctrine as "wholly inconsistent with the
civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Con-
stitution."8 The steady erosion of the doctrine was hastened by two
5 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
1 L. LEvY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 115 (1967).
When Plessy was decided, Roberts was a precedent of doubtful authority since "it
antedated the Civil War and was repudiated by the Massachusetts legislature in 1855
in a statute prohibiting school segregation." R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE
CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 99 (1960).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 562. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter was not prepared to
acknowledge that the first Justice John Marshall Harlan would have favored school
desegregation, as is evident from the two letters on the subject which he sent to the
second Justice John Marshall Harlan:
Dear John:
You and I are not in disagreement that Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson gives no justification for assuming that he would have found
segregation unconstitutional. While you say that that's the most that
can be drawn from his dissent, I would say that's the least that could
be drawn from it. I put it that way because of the repeated restriction
in his discussion to the particular fact of that case, for about a score
of times he referred to the fact that the segregation involved was
discrimination on 'the public highway,' assimilating, as he did, a rail-
road to a public highway. To me, his failure to refer to school segrega-
1977]
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tion is significant, in view of the Court's reference to school discrimi-
nation and the fact that Harlan was not, I believe, persnickety in his
opinions, as an ordinary rule, in restricting his opinions to the narrow
scope of the facts of a case. I need hardly tell you that the notion is
widely prevalent that Harlan anticipated striking down school segre-
gation in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent. That this isn't so is, of course,
important as a matter of historic accuracy.
I gave you the wrong impression as to my purpose in referring to
the nisi prius opinion of Judge Caldwell in Georgia. You are, of course,
right that he didn't find constitutional invalidity in segregation and
that the basis of his opinion was the separate-and-equal doctrine, it
is rather surprising that Harlan should not have been at least as
uncolor-blind as was that Georgia judge. I am not saying that the
Cumming opinion result is not defensible. I am saying that it is a
casuistic bit of reasoning. Anybody who felt passionately against
school segregation could easily have reached at least the result that
the Georgia nisi prius judge reached.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John Marshall Harlan (July 18, 1956). (The Felix
Frankfurter Papers; The Library of Congress.)
When Justice Harlan remained skeptical, Justice Frankfurter pressed his argument
still further:
Dear John:
Since cacophony is not alien to modem music, I dare to intrude upon
you at Tanglewood with a disharmonious note. Duly mindful of all you
say about Plessy, I am sorry to have to stand my ground. I cannot get
away from the incongruity that a fellow who indulged in the broad
rhetoric that the "Constitution is color blind," should have sponsored
such a narrow result in Cumming. Both opinions must be read in the
light of the intellectual habits of Harlan I. If I were dealing with a
Brandeis, whose decisions practically always sailed close to the harbor
of the specific facts of a case, the wearisome reiteration in the Plessy
dissent that it was concerned with rights on a public highway and the
intimation in Cumming that the case was confined to the particular
pleadings, would be merely characteristic of the writer. But whatever
virtues may be attributed to Harlan I, no one, I submit, would
credit-or charge-him with having been a close reasoner, more par-
ticularly, a writer who strictly confined himself to the narrow limits
of a particular case. And even when it comes to what might be called
narrow adjudication, I submit that any judge who thought that the
Constitution, as a legal proposition, is color blind, would at least have
been able to reach the lawyer-like result, which, in my opinion, Judge
Calloway did reach in Superior Court in Georgia, as not leaving co-
lored high school children out in the cold.
Nor am I unmindful of Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases.
About that, I have two things to say. In the first place, as one who
opposed the adoption of the Civil Rights Amendments and thereby
aroused hostility to his appointment, Harlan would not be a unique
instance of a judge, who, by his opinions, contradicted, however un-
consciously, the ground of opposition to him. Moreover, it is not with-
out significance that even in his Civil Rights dissent, the rights which
he urged were "the claim of a colored citizen to use, upon the same
terms as is permitted to white citizens, the accommodations of public
JUSTICE MINTON
decisions in 1950 in which Justice Minton participated. In Sweatt v.
Painter,9 the Court employed the Equal Protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to disallow the State of Texas from prohibiting
the admission of a black to the state's segregated law school. And in
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,'0 the Court held invalid an
Oklahoma law which required a black graduate student to sit apart
from his fellow students both in the classrooms and at the school
cafeteria. When Brown v. Board of Education" and Bolling v.
Sharpe'2 were decided in 1954, Justice Minton joined a unanimous
Court in rejecting the constitutionality of racial segregation by either
the several states or the federal government.
Long opposed to racial discrimination (he had clashed with the
Ku Klux Klan in his political campaigns when the Klan had been
active in southern Indiana), Justice Minton was an uncompromising
advocate within the Court for the result eventually obtained in the
Segregation Cases.'3 Justice Douglas has disclosed that Justice Min-
ton and Justice Burton joined with Justice Black and himself to
permit a grant of certiorari.' 4
Both Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren confirmed Justice
Minton's steadfast opposition to segregation in the public schools.
According to Chief Justice Warren: "He [Justice John Marshall Har-
lan the Elder] said the Constituton was color blind. That's what
Shay said too.""' There were others on the Court, especially Justice
highways, or public inns, or places of public amusement, established
under the license of the law."
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John Marshall Harlan (July 31, 1956) (The Felix
Frankfurter Papers; The Library of Congress.)
9 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
13 The Segregation Cases consisted of 4 cases decided together: Brown v. Board
of Educ., Briggs v. Elliott, Davies v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County and
Gebbart v. Belton, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
", Interview with Justice William 0. Douglas, in Washington, D.C. (January 30,
1968). Justice Douglas' recollection would seem inconsistent with Justice Burton's
record of the votes cast at the Conference of June 7, 1952, where he recorded all
members in favor of noting jurisdiction, with the exception of Justice Jackson who
voted to hold jurisdiction and Chief Justice Vinson, for whom no vote was recorded.
(The Harold H. Burton Papers; The Library of Congress.) Perhaps Justice Douglas
made reference to informal commitments on the issue before a formal vote was taken.
In any event, law clerk recollections tally with what Justice Douglas has said. See
Rodell, It Is the Earl Warren Court, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 138
(L. Levy ed. 1972).
"1 Interview with Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Washington, D.C. (January 31,
1968).
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Frankfurter and Justice Jackson, who were less enthusiastic about
the Segregation Cases. 6
Before a discussion was announced, Justice Frankfurter moved
determinedly to discourage any reliance on the original meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. It is now known that Justice Frankfurter
believed emphatically that "how we do what we do in the Segretation
Cases may be as important as what we do.' 7 He circulated a sixty-
page memorandum on the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment which included the following introductory remarks:
It is, I believe, too much to hope that the Segregation Cases
constitute the last litigation to come before this Court involv-
ing legislation affecting the relations between white and co-
lored people. That being so, it is equally too much to hope that
no further appeal will be made to the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment to support arguments, one way or the
other, as to the intended scope of the Amendment. Having in
the past found Flack's Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment-the usual source of the legislative history of the
Amendment-inadequate as a dependable, well-balanced
summary of that history, I put one of my last Term's law
clerks, Alexander Bickel, to work on such a summary. He was
instructed to reread afresh every word in the Congressional
Globe bearing on what ultimately became the Fourteenth
Amendment, which necessarily included the history of related
measures. Bickel was peculiarly equipped to carry out this
assignment not merely because he has the disciplined habit of
accuracy to a degree unusual even among good lawyers but also
because he is something of a specialist on American history. I
myself spent not a little time in studying and revising his draft,
and his labors had the benefit of a second revision by him and
me. 18
Justice Frankfurter concluded that his historical research indicated
"that the legislative history of the Amendment is, in a word, incon-
clusive, in the sense that the 39th Congress as an enacting body
neither manifested that the Amendment outlawed segregation in the
I9 d.
" Felix Frankfurter to the Court (April 14, 1955). (The Felix Frankfurter Papers;
The Library of Congress.)
1" Felix Frankfurter to the Court (May 18, 1954) (The Harold H. Burton Papers;
The Library of Congress.) See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segre-
gation Decision, 69 HAlv. L. REV. 1 (1955).
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public schools or authorized legislation to that end, nor that it mani-
fested the opposite."' 9
Although Justice Minton was not insensitive to historical argu-
ments, Chief Justice Warren did not think Justice Minton and the
Court were particularly influenced by the Frankfurter memoran-
dum.2 Public education was not in existence in the South at the time
of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment; consequently, the
ambiguities surrounding the legislative intent were irrelevant to the
question presented in the Segregation Cases.
Shortly before he was appointed an Associate Justice, the then
Solicitor General, Thurgood Marshall, consented to an interview on
the Segregation Cases. As chief counsel for the National Association
For the Advancement of Colored People, he had been a leading
strategist in the assault on school segregation.
There was, as Marshall explained, no planned sequence in which
the cases were brought before the Court. The cases which were ac-
cepted by the Court arose suddenly and rather unexpectedly. After
the law school case (Sweatt v. Painter) and the graduate school case
(McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents), Marshall reasoned that the
next cases would logically be ones which involved a college, a high
school, and then an elementary school in that sequence. When Mar-
shall and his associates found their next case following McLaurin
involved an elementary school they were "kind of peeved. We didn't
want it," said Marshall, "but we had it." "
The principal case, Briggs v. Elliott, 2 which came up from South
Carolina, pitted Thurgood Marshall against the former Ambassador
to the Court of St. James and the Democratic candidate for the
Presidency in 1924, John W. Davis, who argued on behalf of the state
of South Carolina. In taking jurisdiction, the Court indicated that
one of the questions in which it had special interest was whether the
fourteenth amendment was intended to abolish segregation in the
public schools. The Attorney General, the appellants, and the appel-
lees all documented lengthy responses to this particular inquiry.
Shortly before the question was argued before the Court, John W.
Davis took Marshall aside in private conversation and said to him,
11 Felix Frankfurter to the Court (December 3, 1953) (The Harold H. Burton
Papers; The Library of Congress.)
" Interview with Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Washington, D.C. (January 31,
1968).
21 Hugh W. Speer's interview with Thurgood Marshall, in Washington, D.C.
(April 3, 1967).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"My brief says positively 'No.' Your brief says positively 'Yes!' The
government brief tells the truth-nobody knows."23
During oral argument Justice Minton said very little. Justice
Frankfurter, above all others, led the questioning from the bench. At
the outset of oral argument, it could not be assumed Justice Frank-
furter could be persuaded to break with the Plessy precedent, at least
with regard to school segregation in the states. He sat, as always, with
an open mind, but he remained to be persuaded.2 Moreover, the
nature of his questions gave scant encouragement to the foes of school
segregation. Early in the argument he admonished Marshall that
when one starts with the assumption that there can be no segregation
there is indeed no problem, for in that case one has begun an argu-
ment with a conclusion.
Justice Frankfurter's comment from the bench could be construed
as an objection to only one of Marshall's three arguments against the
South Carolina statutory and constitutional segregation provisions.
Marshall first argued on the very narrow ground established by
Sweatt and McLaurin. He here maintained the separate but equal
doctrine had not been adequately implemented in South Carolina.
Second, he contended the statutory and constitutional provisions of
the state represented arbitrary classifications and were violative of
the Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. And third,
he insisted that distinctions based on race were in and of themselves
invidious. He believed that any one of these three grounds provided
a sufficient basis for reversal. Marshall's first argument, and possibly
his second, assumed the continued existence of racial segregation.
Justice Frankfurter's invariable practice was, however, not to read
briefs before oral argument, which was the practice then followed on
the Second Circuit. He therefore tended to ask a number of questions
which were largely superfluous. Justice Minton, on the other hand,
followed the customary practice of the Seventh Circuit by reading
each brief before oral argument.
The Segregation Cases were treated procedurally quite unlike any
other cases which were before the Court. Everyone- including the
law clerks-was excluded by the Justices from any contact with their
deliberations.2' Great secrecy surrounded the preparation of the opin-
Hugh W. Speer's interview with Thurgood Marshall in Washington, D.C. (April
3, 1967). This was of course not inconsistent with Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that
no clear intent in fact existed.
24 For a reconstruction of judicial attitudes within the Court based on the Burton
Papers, see Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. PoL. 689 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Ulmer].
r Interview with one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks.
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ions. Justice Minton's secretary recalled that shortly before the cases
were announced, Justice Minton abruptly took them from his desk
and said, "Frances, what do you think?"2 The secretaries had not
been included in the Court's confidence and even special precautions
were taken in the typing of memoranda connected with the cases.
On May 7, 1954, Chief Justice Warren circulated the following
memorandum to the Court, accompanied by the Brown and Boiling
opinions:
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT:
As suggested by the Conference, I submit the attached
memoranda as a basis for discussion of the segregation cases.
It seemed to me there should be two opinions-one for the
state cases, and another for the District of Columbia case.
Also, because of the divergent conditions calling for relief and
because this subject was subordinated to a discussion of the
substantive question in both the briefs and oral argument, the
cases should be restored to the calendar for further argument
on Questions IV and V previously submitted by the Court for
the reargument this year. It also occurred to me that we might
appropriately invite the Attorneys General of the States re-
quiring or permitting segregation to present their written and
oral views should they desire to do so.
The memos were prepared on the theory that the opinions
should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical,
unemotional, and above all, non-accusatory.27
There was very little difference between Chief Justice Warren's me-
moranda opinions and the opinions which were finally adopted by the
Court.
Thurgood Marshall was certain that the result in the Segregation
Cases was influenced by Earl Warren's appointment as Chief Jus-
tice.28 Because of Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion in
Barrows v. Jackson, 2 which concerned a racially restrictive conven-
ant, it was not entirely evident how he viewed the segregation issue.
21 Interview with Justice Sherman Minton's secretary (January 30, 1968).
2 Memorandum from Earl Warren to the Court (May 7, 1954) (The Harold H.
Burton Papers; The Library of Congress).
"R Hugh W. Speer's interview with Thurgood Marshall, in Washington, D.C.
(April 3, 1967). See also Ulmer, supra note 21, at 702. Ulmer persuasively documents
the conclusion that, "The unanimous opinion in the case must, of course, be attributed
to Warren." Id.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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The power of persuasion which lies with a Chief Justice who is willing
to exercise it may in certain circumstances be an important factor.
And especially so in the Segregation Cases, for it would seem that




In urging the abolition of segregation, Marshall and his associates
relied on testimony furnished by a group of social scientists.3 1 In oral
argument, John W. Davis objected to any reliance on this sort of
evidence in scathing language:
It seems to me that much of that which is handed around
under the name of social science in an effort on the part of the
sicentist to rationalize his own preconceptions. They find
usually, in my limited observation, what they go out to find.32
Others have since been more kindly disposed toward the use of social
science testimony and have expressed optimism with regard to the
benefits likely to be conferred on the fact-finding process in the
courts.3 3 In effect, Marshall submitted a Brandeis Brief, an eviden-
tiary technique which in recent years has been used increasingly by
counsel in cases involving securities, federal trade regulations, and
labor relations.
3 4
"One of the reasons the court ruled against segregation in educa-
tion," Justice Minton later said, "was that it was a discrimination
against the colored school child that was psychologically detrimen-
tal."35 His comment suggested the importance and wisdom of placing
social science testimony before the Court.
Shortly after the decisions in the Segregation Cases were handed
down by the Court, Thurgood Marshall met privately with Justice
Frankfurther, who then told him, "I have a feeling you gave me the
right answer."
"I sure did," replied Marshall.
Justice Frankfurter then asked, in a mock inquisitorial manner,
"What is the right answer?"
"I See Ulmer, supra note 21, at 699. Justice Burton's Diary reveals he was uncer-
tain as to the Court's unanimity five days before the opinion was read. (The Harold
H. Burton Papers; The Library of Congress.)
3' See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
31 See also Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150 (1955).
3 See Tanenhaus, Social Science in Civil Rights Litigation, in ASPECTS OF LIaBRTY
91-114 (M. Konvitz and C. Rossiter eds. 1958).
11 See M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 60-67 (3d ed.
1972).
1 "Retired Justice's Revealing Words on School Decision," 4 LA. B.J. 149 (1957).
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Marshall answered, "I put it in there [the social science appen-
dix] so that you would not have to tell your law clerks to go look it
up.
"I thought that is why you put it in there," said Justice Frank-
furter. "You saved the life of that clerk. That's just what I would have
done.""
Some years later, on the occasion of his 70th birthday, Justice
Minton reflected on the decisions in which he had participated and
concluded that none had exceeded the Segregation Cases in import-




Although Justice Minton was not known to express particular
interest in any one area of constitutional law, nor did his colleagues
indicate any widespread recognition of such expertise, some of them
did seem to regard him as a technically skillful constitutional lawyer.
His opinion in Barrows v. Jackson, 3 a case replete with constitutional
difficulties, lends credence to this judgment of his legal ability.
In Shelley v. Kraemer,31 which was delivered before Justice Min-
ton came to the Court, it was decided that a state could not enforce
private discrimination. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court,
held that racially restrictive covenants could not be enforced in eq-
uity against black purchasers. State enforcement of such covenants
was a violation of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. The principal thrust of the Court's opin-
ion was fairly obvious: action by a state court is state action. What
was not obvious was whether this was state action within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. Herbert Wechsler, who was decidedly
critical of the Court's rationale in Shelley, explained that under the
Court's reasoning "the state may properly be charged with the dis-
crimination when it does no more than give effect to an agreement
that the individual involved is, by hypothesis, entirely free to
make." 0 Accordingly, the question Wechsler insisted must be asked
was: precisely what was the principle the Court thought was involved
in Shelley? He found it entirely ambiguous.
3, Hugh W. Speer's interview with Thurgood Marshall, in Washington, D.C.
(April 3, 1967).
3 Associated Press release, October 20, 1960. (The Harold H. Burton Papers; The
Library of Congress.)
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
- 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Although the complexities of the case should not be minimized,
it may be suggested that Wechsler somewhat overstated them. A
classificiation enforced by state law may be reasonable when there is
a persuasive basis for the classification. The fourteenth amendment
is, of course, not a bar to discrimination per se; but it does forbid
discrimination based on an unreasonable classification. There must
be a legitimate reason for private discrimination which, to be effec-
tive, depends on state enforcement even as there must be a legitimate
reason for governmental discrimination. Hence, the general principle
which emerged from Shelley was simply that "a state may not enforce
discrimination which it would not itself require or perpetrate.'",
In Barrows, the petitioners sought to distinguish their case from
Shelley. Petitioners' counsel characterized Shelley as a case where a
contract between A and B was enforced against C, who was not a
party to the contract. In Barrows, however, the question was whether
a state court could award damages for breach of contract. The peti-
tioners in Barrows were white property owners who were subject to
the same racial restrictions as the respondent, who was a former
white owner who had sold land to a black. Contract damages were
demanded of the respondent, who had clearly breached her contract.
The case was not an easy one since the Court in Shelley had dealt
only with the enforceability of racially restrictive convenants through
state action. Racially restrictive covenants were not, on the authority
of Shelley, unconstitutional. The Constitution was found not to bar
voluntary compliance.
The Supreme Court's refusal to declare racially restrictive cove-
nants illegal while at the same time declining to give them legal effect
created some uncertainty in the law. The approach of the Vinson
Court (which was to treat such covenants as illegal in practice if not
in form) raised important implications for the concept of state action.
To reach a desired result, it was necessary for the Court, as in
Barrows, to expand the traditional meaning of state action.
When the Court was confronted with the factual situation in
Barrows, a tentative majority of four Justices eventually coalesced
around Justice Black (with Justices Reed and Jackson not participat-
ing) and a determination was made to disallow recovery for dam-
,0 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 29 (1959). Cf. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
1 See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 490-91 (1962).
JUSTICE MINTON
ages.4 2 They were initially uncertain as to how to obtain the desired
substantive result.
There was a further problem. As the senior Justice in the tentative
majority, Justice Black was much concerned that whatever was circu-
lated might alienate someone, thereby changing the result. Because
of the delicacy of the case, Justice Black assigned the opinion to
Justice Minton.13 The case was known to pose one of the more diffi-
cult legal problems of the October Term, 1952. Justice Minton de-
vised a legal solution which eventually satisfied all members of the
Court with the exception of Chief Justice Vinson.
The first question in Barrows to which Justice Minton addressed
himself was whether damages awarded by a state court constituted
state action as required by the fourteenth amendment. If the state
court allowed recovery for breach of contract, in effect the state would
be punishing the respondent for refusing to discriminate in accord-
ance with the terms of an unenforceable racially restrictive covenant.
"Thus," said Justice Minton, "it becomes not respondent's voluntary
choice but the State's choice that she observe her covenant or suffer
damages. The action of a state court at law to sanction the validity
of the restrictive covenant here involved would constitute state action
as surely as if it was state action to enforce such covenants in equity,
as in Shelley."44
If contract damages were disallowed, whose constitutional right
would be violated? Justice Minton expressed interest in this issue
during oral argument when he asked the respondent's lawyer whose
constitutional rights would be violated if California failed to award
contract damages to the petitioners. The lawyer replied that no one's
rights would be violated.
The corollary question was whether, if contract damages were
allowed, any constitutionally protected rights would be abridged.
There were no non-Caucasians before the Court. Unidentified (but
identifiable) non-Caucasians were the third party to the litigation. In
effect, the respondent defended her breach of contract by invoking
the rights of a third party not directly involved in the case. This
practice had long been disfavored by the Court, but Justice Minton
viewed the situation presented in Barrows as unique. He counseled
,2 At Conference the initial vote was as follows: Justices Clark, Burton, Douglas,
and Black voted to affirm; Justices Minton and Frankfurter voted to dismiss the case
as improvidently granted; Chief Justice Vinson voted to reverse; and Justices Jackson
and Reed did not participate. (The Sherman Minton Papers; The Truman Library.)
13 Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks.
" 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
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against an adherence to the consistent application of rules of proce-
dure which would permit the implementation of a kind of covenant
"universally condemned by the courts."45
By bringing an action for damages in the amount of $11,600
against the respondent, the petitioners avoided joining in the action
persons against whom they intended to discriminate. The rather ob-
vious purpose of the damage action was to intimidate white sellers
who might at a future time elect to sell their property to a non-
Caucasian. Since the petitioners attempted to invoke the assistance
of a state court to avoid the effect of Shelley v. Kraemer, which
forbade the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by recourse
to the judicial process, the Court's most difficult hurdle was perhaps
not the alleged absence of state action, but whether the effect of
Shelley could be so easily circumvented by a state court. If so, non-
Caucasians would still be denied the equal protection of the laws.
It could be argued that since Shelley established the principle
that racially restrictive covenants were unenforceable, it might then
follow that the Court should not elect to hear a case wherein improper
assistance was sought. So reasoned, the Court could move to dismiss
Barrows on its own motion, even though the point was not raised by
the respondent, since jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver. The
situation was analogous to those cases where the parties attempted
to confer jurisdiction on a court, as in a collusive divorce action. To
summarize, inasmuch as the petitioner's purpose was unconstitu-
tional under the Shelley doctrine, it could be contended the Court
was without jurisdiction to hear the case and should have dismissed
it on its own motion. This was a dispositional recommendation which
was made by one of Justice Minton's clerks."
It was uncertain whether the respondent could prevent injury to
herself by seeking protection from unconstitutonal action directed
toward unidentified third parties not before the Court. A possible
explanation was, of course, that a denial of equal protection to per-
sons not before the Court would nonetheless injure the respondent.
This explanation may be supported by cases which have arisen in
the field of administrative law. When administrative agencies, en-
trusted with the protection of public welfare, have acted contrary to
their trust, competitors of those who received the improper advan-
tages conferred by the agency have been allowed to raise the question
's Id. at 259.
' See the undated memoranda prepared by Justice Sherman Minton's law clerk
concerning Barrows v. Jackson. (The Sherman Minton Papers; The Truman Library.)
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of the impropriety, even though the administrative agency owed no
duty to the complainant.
A similar result was reached in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"7 where
a state statute had required parents to send their children to public
schools. The Court accepted jurisdiction in an action brought by a
parochial school and a private school on behalf of parents and guardi-
ans not before the Court. The Court held the state statute unconstitu-
tional in the Pierce case because it "unreasonably interfere[d] with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."" Justice Burton was espe-
cially pleased with Justice Minton's reliance on Pierce, for he found
the analogy complete and persuasive.49
As in Pierce, the situation in Barrows was somewhat unique. Even
though no particular individual could be isolated as the recipient of
a constitutional injury inasmuch as the non-Caucasian had already
taken possession of the property, a verdict in favor of the petitioner
could have resulted in the future denial of property conveyance to
non-Caucasians.
There was yet another option for the respondent to explore. A
constitutional interpretation problem was posed as to the meaning of
''any person" in the fourteenth amendment's Due Process clause.
What is the meaning of "any person"? If the Court had awarded
damages to the petitioner, no specific "person" would have been
discriminated against. But as indicated by the number of amicus
curiae briefs which were filed, it could not be doubted that many
persons believed they would be adversely affected by a decision in
favor of the petitioner. It is therefore significant that the Constitution
does not refer to "any specific and named person." The constitutional
reference to "any person" may be thought, with due appreciation of
the uniqueness of the situation in Barrows, to have reference to per-
sons who were momentarily unidentified.
In Justice Minton's final draft, as published, there were two para-
graphs written by his clerks (which they strongly felt should not be
omitted) wherein they argued that the Court was not arbitrarily
regarding its long settled practice of denying standing to one who
wishes to vindicate the constitutional rights of parties not before the
Court. The clerks also successfully impressed upon the Justice the
need to limit as narrowly as possible the holding on standing. Other-
47 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
" Id. at 534-35.
" Letter from Harold H. Burton to Sherman Minton concerning Barrows v.
Jackson (undated). (The Sherman Minton Papers; The Truman Library.)
19771
112 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
wise, the Court might be asked to consider the alleged constitutional
deprivations of third parties not before the Court in a bewildering
variety of cases.
A rule was needed which recognized A's standing in Barrows, but
which denied standing to A in those circumstances where the Court
had held A has no standing. A possible rule, as stated by one of
Justice Minton's clerks, was as follows: "A has standing to raise B's
rights if, and only if, a judgment against A would inflict on both A
and B a legally recognizable injury."5
The Barrows case clearly conformed to this rule. Certain tax-
payer's suits, where the legal injury is indirect, trivial, and remote,
are distinguishable because A, the respondent in Barrows, had
$11,600 at issue.
III. The Perimeter of Government Action
Some of his clerks have suggested that Justice Minton did not
entertain a consistent theory of constitutional adjudication. He in-
stead approached each case on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps his dissent-
ing opinion in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard5 lends
some support to this interpretation. Although he was able to devise
a solution which forbade racial discrimination in Barrows v. Jackson,
he was unwilling to join Justice Black and the Court in the Howard
case, decided only a year earlier. There an all white union, the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers Union, and the railroad company attempted to contract
away positions held by black porters. The effect of the contract would
have been to cause the dismissal of black porters solely because of
their race.
Justice Minton, joined by Justice Reed and Chief Justice Vinson,
took the position that the Brotherhood in no way represented the
black porters. The porters had in years past bargained separately
with the company. Accordingly, the Brotherhood did not consider
itself the bargaining agent of the porters, who had their own elected
representative through which they bargained with the company. Jus-
tice Minton concluded that the Court did not invalidate the contract
between the company and the Brotherhood because the porters were
entitled to be represented by the Brotherhood. Instead, he concluded
that the Court's reason for invalidating the contract could be solely
" See the undated memoranda prepared by Justice Sherman Minton's law clerk
concerning Barrows v. Jackson. (The Sherman Minton Papers; The Truman Library.)
343 U.S. 768, 775 (1952) (Minton, J., dissenting).
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attributed to the fact that the porters were blacks who were being
discriminated against by the company at the Brotherhood's instiga-
tion. Justice Minton saw no constitutional reason why two private
parties-the company and the Brotherhood-could not discriminate
against third parties on the basis of race if they so desired, even
though similar discrimination could not be tolerated by either the
state governments or the federal government. Here the distinguishing
feature was private discrimination. Justice Minton did not doubt the
power of the Court to annul the contract agreed to by the Brotherhood
and the company. But he did warn his colleagues that "sheer power
is not a substitute for legality. '52 He did not, as he said, "have to
agree with the discrimination here indulged in to question the legality
of today's decision."53
Because the Brotherhood enjoined the benefits of economic pro-
tection under the Railway Labor Act, Justice Black and the Court
reasoned that a privileged position created by an act of the federal
government could not be used to discriminate racially against other
workers. Justice Black's rationale in Howard was not drastically dif-
ferent from the reasoning used a year later by Justice Minton in the
Barrows case. In both cases the Court was confronted with racial
discrimination; in both cases the concept of state or federal action
was of questionable applicability; and in both cases the Court re-
solved the issue substantively in favor of the party against whom
discriminatory sanctions were directed. On the other hand, Justice
Minton's Court papers indicate he perceived the jurisdictional issue
to be of paramount importance in Barrows whereas in Howard the
hard question was the source of state action. So viewed, the two cases
were distinguishable since they presented dissimilar issues.
Another case which involved minority rights came before the
Court when the constitutionality of the Texas Jaybird Democratic
Association was questioned in 1953. Terry v. Adams 4 was by no
means free of difficulty. Although all members of the Court, with the
exception of Justice Minton, agreed that the Jaybird Association
practiced racial discrimination in a manner disallowed by the Consti-
tution, the Justices differed sharply among themselves as to the rea-
sons for their disapproval.
The Jaybird Association, which was first organized in 1889, had
always restricted its membership to white persons whose name ap-
peared on the county voting polls. In both form and practice, the
52 Id. at 778.
"Id.
5 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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Jaybird Association functioned similarly to the regular political par-
ties in Texas, even though it purported to be a private organization.
Those candidates who were successful in the Jaybird primary invaria-
bly entered the Democratic Party's primary where they were usually
unopposed. Since the support of the Democratic party was tanta-
mount to election in Texas, the Jaybird Association's primary was
the decisive determinant in the Texas election process.
Justice Black, who wrote the Court's opinion, held that the Jay-
bird Association functioned in violation of the fifteenth amendment
which prohibits an abridgment of the right to vote because of race.
By allowing the Jaybird Association to duplicate the state-regulated
election process, Texas had improperly permitted the circumvention
of the fifteenth amendment. The Jaybird primary, the Democratic
primary, and the general election were viewed as an integrated whole
which abridged the right to vote.
Justice Frankfurter, in a separate concurring opinion, held the
state responsible for having tolerated a scheme which denied voting
rights to citizens because of race. He believed that a court of equity
was not without the power to enjoin the activities of the Jaybird
Association, since those activities had caused the process through
which all voters exercised their political opinions to become dysfunc-
tional.
55
Justice Clark also wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined
by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson, in which he
concluded that the Jaybird Association was in fact a political party,
operating as an integral part of the Texas Democratic party.5 Conse-
quently, the activities of the Jaybird Association were found to fall
within the Court's ruling in Smith v. Allwright,5 7 where the Texas
Democratic party was found to violate the fifteenth amendment when
it excluded blacks from voting in the party's primary.
The Terry case was the occasion for one of Justice Minton's long-
est and most spirited dissents. Although he seldom dissented (and
even then only infrequently dissented at length), he was here per-
suaded there was no state action which could bring the activities of
the Jaybird Association within the scope of the fifteenth amendment.
He was, as he said, "not concerned in the least as to what happens
to the Jaybirds or their unworthy scheme.""8 But he was "concerned
about what this Court says is state action within the meaning of the
' Id. at 470-77.
' Id. at 477-84.
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953).
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Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution." 9 The fifteenth amend-
ment does not, he emphasized, apply to discriminatory misconduct
by a private party.
Justice Minton was displeased with what he deemed was Justice
Black's mistaken willingness to invoke the fifteenth amendment to
invalidate private as well as state action. Although Justice Minton
found this view "praiseworthy,""0 he did not find it in the language
of the fifteenth amendment, which clearly states that state action
must be shown. Although Justice Frankfurter recognized the need for
state action, he seemed to assume that the requirement was suffi-
ciently met if state officials in any way participated in the Jaybird
primary. This participation was thought to constitute the requisite
state action. Justice Minton considered this analysis vulnerable on
two grounds. Initially, he could not admit that all acts in which state
officials engage are definitionally infused with the imprimatur of
state action, nor, even assuming the logic of Justice Frankfurter's
argument, could he find satisfactory evidence in the record of partici-
pation by state officials in the Jaybird primary."' Justice Clark's
Id.
Id. at 485.
" Justice Frankfurter acknowledged the strength of Justice Minton's dissent, al-
though he elected to hold to his own views as stated in his concurrence;
Dear Shay:
Such is the perversity of the human mind that while I find your
dissent in Terry u. Adams wholly convincing in exposing the inade-
quacies of the Black and Clark opinions, you leave me undisturbed in
my own view of the same.
Not only do I think you have made out a powerful case for your
position, but I should like to take satisfaction, if you will let me, in
having you express the convictions you entertain. I say "if you will let
me," because I like to think that whatever may be our differences on
the merits of problems you and I deeply have in common what is more
important than agreement in opinion. It is agreement about the duty
to express convictions and not yield merely on the score of prudence
or good fellowship or whatever the reason may be by which convictions
that matter are suppressed and their opposites are embraced.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton (April 29, 1953). (The Felix Frank-
furter Papers; The Library of Congress.)
Justice Minton responded to Justice Frankfurter as follows, on one of the few major
cases on which they disagreed.
My dear Felix:
I appreciate more than I can tell you your generous remarks about my
dissent in the Jaybird case. Since I have been here, you have com-
forted me more than a little, not only by your attitude towards my
work but in our personal relations.
I know you will always feel free to criticize as well as approve, and I
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opinion was summarily rejected for essentially the same reasons. It
was gratuitous to assume that the Jaybird Association functioned
merely as an auxiliary to the Democratic Party in the absence of
evidence more specific than that brought before the Court.
IV. Conclusion
The cases affecting minority groups which came before the Vinson
Court can be generally placed into one of three categories. The cases
involved the constitutionality of segregation in education, the limits
of private discrimination with regard to property interests which de-
pend on state enforcement, and private discrimination affecting the
political representation of minority groups. A determinative consider-
ation in the two latter classifications was the extent and type of state
action presented by the facts in a given case.
Justice Minton found the most difficulty with questions raised
within the second and third classifications and had relatively little
difficulty with the first classification. He was a thorough Midwestern
populist who attached special importance to the equitable treatment
of all persons when state involvement was obvious. His vote in the
Segregation Cases was not in question. As he told the other Justices
in Conference on December 12, 1953, he "could simply imagine no
valid distinction based on race or color. He was in favor of outlawing
public-school segregation on both equal-protection and due-process
grounds and was inclined to let the District Courts have their heads
in the matter."6 2 During oral argument he spoke infrequently, al-
though he did question the petitioner's counsel in the Prince Edward
County case 3 (which was one of the consolidated segregation cases)
on the meaning of the fifth amendment's Due Process clause. Justice
Minton inquired whether the adoption of a due process clause in the
fourteenth amendment in any way changed the meaning of the fifth
amendment's Due Process clause. Counsel replied that inasmuch as
the thirteenth amendment abolished slavery and the first clause of
the fourteenth amendment conferred federal citizenship on "all per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof," these two considerations removed any power
the federal government might otherwise have retained to deal with
assure you I shall appreciate both-as I have your friendship.
Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter (April 29, 1953). (The Felix Frank-
furter Papers; The Library of Congress.)
'z Ulmer, supra note 21, at 695.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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persons solely on the basis of race or color. The Due Process clause
of the fifth amendment should, counsel implied, be given the same
meaning as the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment, at
least with regard to segregated educational facilities. This position,
as argued in response to Justice Minton's question, was reflected in
the Court's opinion in Boiling v. Sharpe, which implemented the
Brown decision in the District of Columbia under the authority of the
fifth amendment. Significantly, the major question Justice Minton
asked in oral argument raised a point of law. His personal inclinations
were usually tempered by a close examination of the authority on
which he was asked to rely.
Justice Minton reacted differently to cases involving private dis-
crimination which only tangentially involved state action. Although
he was able to discover state action in Barrows v. Jackson, he was
unable to find state action in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Howard and Terry v. Adams. The cases are distinguisable on the
ground that in the former, intervention by the state was required to
implement private action, while in the latter it was not. Whether that
distinction should differentiate as between private and state action
is a fair question, but that distinction, whether fair or not, explains
Justice Minton's votes in these cases.
Several important short-term contributions were made by Justice
Minton to constitutional law insofar as the protection of minority
groups was concerned. Principally, he refused to compromise the
legal rights of black Americans within the public school system and
provided one of the votes needed to bring the Segregation Cases be-
fore the Supreme Court. He furthermore devised the rationale, in
Barrows v. Jackson, which persuaded the Court to disallow the cir-
cumvention of its policy forbidding the enforcement of restrictive
convenants founded on race. Thus, in the public schools and in hous-
ing his views were implemented by landmark decisions which pro-
tected minority interests. On the other hand, his long range influence
was decidedly more modest. His reluctance to extend the concept of
state action to many situations where the state was indirectly in-
volved resulted in a far narrower scope of protection for minority
interests than the rest of the Court was willing to permit.
1977]

Washington and Lee Law Review
Member of the National and Southern Law Review Conferences










WILLIAM R. BALDWIN, III
Special Projects Editor
H. GREGORY WILLIAMS
























LARRY J. RATZEL, JR.
PAMELA ROGERS







ROBERT E. R. HUNTLEY, A.B., LL.B., LL.M.
President and Professor of Law
Roy L. STEINHEIMER, JR., A.B., J.D.
Dean and Professor of Law
LAWRENCE D. GAUGHAN, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Professor of Law
LEWIS H. LARUE, A.B., LL.B.
Professor of Law
CHARLES V. LAUGHLIN, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., J.S.D.
Professor of Law
ANDREW W. MCTHENIA, JR., A.B., M.A., LL.B.
Professor of Law
WILFRED J. RITZ, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D.
Professor of Law
JAMES W. H. STEWART, B.S., LL.B., LL.M.
Professor of Law
JOSEPH E. ULRICH, A.B., LL.B.
Professor of Law
DAVID R. MUMMERY, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D.
Visiting Professor of Law
ROGER D. GROOT, B.A., J.D.
Associate Professor of Law
PEYTON R. NEAL, JR., B.S., J.D.
Law Librarian and Associate Professor of Law
BENJAMIN M. VANDEGRIFT, A.B., J.D.
Associate Professor of Law
MARK H. GRUNEWALD, B.A., J.D.
Assistant Professor of Law
LAWRENCE K. HELLMAN, B.S., M.B.A., J.D.
Assistant Professor of Law
NATHAN G. OSTROFF, B.A., LL.B.
Assistant Professor of Law
JAMES M. PHEMISTER, B.S., J.D.
Assistant Professor of Law
ANNE UNVERZAGT, B.A., M.A.T., J.D.
Assistant Professor of Law
ROBERT M. CAMPBELL, A.B., LL.B.
Adjunct Professor of Law
EDWARD S. GRAVES, A.B., M.A., J.D.
Adjunct Professor of Law
PAUL A. HOLSTEIN, LL.B.
Adjunct Professor of Law
WILLIAM W. SWEENEY, A.B., LL.B.
Adjunct Professor of Law
HENRY L. WOODWARD, B.A., LL.B.
Adjunct Professor of Law
BARBARA BREEDEN KENNEY, A.B., M.D.
